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Spence (1974a) considered a variant of his signaling model in which there are two types of jobs, 
and in which signaling can increase wealth by improving the allocation of individuals to jobs. 
Using results in signaling games since Spence’s work---the Riley outcome (Riley, 1979), the 
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), and undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993)---it 
is possible to be more precise than Spence was in determining when signaling would occur and 
what the effect of signaling on wealth would be. We find the likelihood of efficient signaling, 
inefficient signaling, and pooling equilibria depends on the fraction of more able individuals in 
the population. With non-trivial gains from job allocation, inefficient signaling does not appear 




















  Scholars and pundits continue to debate whether education increases productivity 
(Leonhardt, 2011). In a study for the Social Science Research Council, Arum et al. (2011) find 
36% of college students have learned very little after four years. However, even if education 
does not directly affect productivity, if it is used as a signal of inherent ability, it may increase 
wealth.  
  In his classic work on market signaling, Spence (1974a) considered a world in which 
more able individuals would signal their ability in order to be paid more. If there is only one type 
of job, and signaling, say via education, does not directly affect individual productivity, there is 
no output gain from signaling---wealth is simply redistributed from the less able to the more 
able.
1 
  Spence (1974a) also considered a variant of his basic signaling model in which there are 
two types of jobs, and in which signaling can increase wealth by improving the allocation of 
individuals to jobs. As discussed below, when the allocation of individuals to jobs matters, 
Spence found signaling may increase or decrease wealth. 
  Since Spence’s initial analysis of signaling, there have been several results in signaling 
models. These include the idea of the lowest cost signaling equilibrium, the Riley outcome 
(Riley, 1979), the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), and undefeated equilibrium (Mailath 
et al., 1993). All of these results will be discussed below. When using these results, it is possible 
                                                       
1 Spence (2002) considered the case when education is a signal and it increases individual productivity. Then all individuals 
would invest in some education, even with perfect information. If the marginal cost of signaling is significantly larger for less 
able individuals than for the more able, excessive investment in education would not occur; the less able would not desire to 
mimic the education level of the more able, even if doing so resulted in the former being paid as if they were more able. With a 
small enough difference in the marginal cost of signaling, the more able would have to invest in a larger amount of education 
than they would with perfect information. Leppämäki and Mustonen (2009) consider a model where the signal may create either 
a positive or negative product market externality. 
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to be more precise than Spence was in determining when signaling would occur and what the 
effect of signaling on wealth would be. These results do not appear to have been used 
previously
2 to consider the Spence model when job allocation matters.
3 Most signaling research 
has focused on the existence of equilibrium.
4 The goal of this paper is to apply the Riley 
outcome, the intuitive criterion, and undefeated equilibrium to essentially the same model used 
by Spence (1974a).
5  
 Using  the  Riley outcome, the intuitive criterion, and undefeated equilibrium, one can 
address two important issues in Spence’s analysis of job assignment. First, Spence allows for 
multiple signaling equilibria.
6 He mentions the possibility of firms competing and lowering the 
required education level as much as possible, but suggests there is not much incentive for them 
to do so (Spence, 1974a, p.170). Cho and Kreps (1987) argue only a separating equilibrium with 
the lowest possible level of the signal, the Riley outcome, survives their intuitive criterion.
7  
  Second, Spence was not clear on when pooling equilibria might occur, arguing we might 
have such equilibria “...either by fiat, or naturally as an equilibrium...” (Spence, 1974a, p.156). 
With the concept of undefeated equilibrium, Mailath et al. (1993) refine the intuitive criterion, 
which rules out all pooling equilibria, and demonstrate pooling should only occur when the more 
                                                       
2 Greenberg (1989) modeled job allocation, and found signaling might result in inefficient allocation of individuals to jobs. His 
results are based on the possibility of multiple signaling equilibria (ruled out by the intuitive criterion), and on not considering 
when individuals would deviate from a pooling equilibrium (undefeated equilibrium). 
3 A different job allocation literature was begun by Waldman (1984). In his model, job assignment within a firm is used by 
potential employers as a signal of an individual’s ability. For a model that combines education as a test and job assignment as a a 
signal, see Perri (1993). 
4 Among the large literature on existence of equilibrium in signaling games are Riley (1975, 1979, and 2002), Cho and Kreps 
(1987), Mailath et al. (1993), and Cai et al. (2007). 
5 Spence (1974b) considered a model of job allocation in which individuals are continuously distributed with respect to ability. 
The results are similar to those with two types of ability, so the latter is the focus herein. 
6 In a later paper (1976), Spence considered competition in the credentials dimension which eliminated all but the Pareto 
dominant signaling equilibrium, but did so only with certain production functions. Thus, multiple signaling equilibria were not 
ruled out in general. 
7 Riley (1975) argued 1) only the signaling equilibrium with the lowest level of signaling would survive experimentation by 
buyers, and 2) even that equilibrium might not survive. Riley (1979) suggests different assumptions can result in survival of the 
signaling equilibrium with the lowest level of signaling, as does the work of Cho and Kreps (1987).  Page 5 of 24 
 
able are better off pooling (with no investment in the signal) than they would be in a separating 
equilibrium with the with the lowest level of signaling.
8 As will be seen, we should expect 
pooling to occur when the fraction of more able individuals in the population, , is sufficiently 
large. 
  One recent paper that did consider a signaling model with more than one job is Hopkins 
(forthcoming). He analyzed a matching model in which the signal at least identifies individuals 
inherent ability, and may increase the value of the match. In this model, individuals do not 
consider the benefit of their signal to potential partners, and, for this reason, may underinvest in 
the signal. Thus, signaling in a matching environment may involve externalities that have 
opposite effects. In a job allocation model, there are no offsetting effects. What distinguishes the 
latter type of model is the social and private returns to signaling are not the same, so we may 
have efficient or inefficient signaling.    
  We consider Spence’s model of job allocation in the next section. Using Spence’s four 
basic assumptions, along with the Riley outcome, the intuitive criterion, and undefeated 
equilibrium, we show the following in Section 3: when  is relatively small, we get an 
equilibrium with signaling that improves wealth; when  is somewhat larger, we get a signaling 
equilibrium that lowers wealth; and for the largest values of , we get a pooling equilibrium 
when pooling involves higher wealth than we would have with signaling. The likelihood of these 
different scenarios is considered in Section 4, and a summary is contained in Section 5. 
 
2. The Spence Model of Job Allocation 
                                                       
8 See the Appendix for a brief discussion of the intuitive criterion and undefeated equilibrium. Page 6 of 24 
 
  In his dissertation, Spence (1974a) apparently did not view the job allocation problem as 
having great importance, since he relegated the analysis of the problem to an appendix.
9 Spence 
apparently did not think the problem was of too much interest because the results were 
ambiguous. We find signaling may or may not improve wealth, but we also show the results are 
based on the share of more able individuals in the population, . 
  The job allocation model we use is essentially that found in Spence (1974a). We assume 
two types of individuals, more able and less able, and two types of jobs, skilled and unskilled.
10 
The (constant) marginal revenue products (MRPs) of individuals in different jobs are listed in 
Table One. 
Table One. MRPs. 
          More Able     Less Able 
       Skilled Jobs                  e            
   Unskilled Jobs              a       a
 
 
  Spence used four basic assumptions, which we also employ. The first three assumptions 
refer to Table One, where   > 0. 
 
Assumption One. The more able are more productive in the skilled job than are the less able. 
This requires e > 1. 
 
Assumption Two. The more able are more productive in skilled jobs than are the less able in 
unskilled jobs. This requires e > a. 
 
Assumption Three. The less able are more productive in unskilled jobs than they are in skilled 
jobs. This requires a > 1. 
 
                                                       
9 In his book, Spence says he considered the problem of job allocation “...largely in response to suggestions and questions raised 
by Zvi Griliches and George Stigler...” (1974a). He also devoted only four of thirty-seven pages in a journal article on signaling 
to job allocation (Spence, 1974b). 
10 In Spence (1974a), more able individuals are called Group 2, less able individuals are called Group 1, the skilled job is called 
Job 2, and the unskilled job is called Job 1. Page 7 of 24 
 
Assumption Four. The marginal cost of signaling is lower for the more able than it is for the less 
able. With the level of the signal denoted by y, assume the cost of signaling is y for the less able, 




   An additional question is the productivity of the two types of individuals in the unskilled 
job. Spence considered two possibilities: 1) the more able have a larger MRP in the unskilled job 
than the less able, and 2) the opposite of 1). From Table One, we assume both types have the 
same productivity in the unskilled job. There are three reasons for this assumption. First, it is 
essentially the average of what Spence considered. Second, it allows us to reduce possible cases 
to consider. Third, and most importantly, ability should be of less importance in an unskilled job. 
We simply assume it is of no ability. In the next section, we briefly consider what happens if 
more and less able individuals do not have the same productivity in the unskilled job. 
  Before proceeding to our model of job allocation, for purposes of comparison, consider 
the results in Spence (1974a). First, consider the case when pooling (with y = 0) would result in 
all placed in the unskilled job. Using our notation, Spence found  signaling increases wealth (is 
efficient) if e-a and g are high enough, and the signal level is low enough. In contrast, for this 
case, we find wealth always is increased with signaling. Second, when pooling would result in all 
placed in the unskilled job, Spence found, when signaling benefits the less able, it also benefits 
the more able, so wealth clearly increases. In this case, we find the following. 
 Signaling can not benefit the less able, since they will be paid less than the pooling wage if the 
more able signal. 
 Signaling may benefit the more able. When it does, it may or may not increase wealth, 
depending on . 
                                                       
11One criticism of signaling models is the assumption signaling cost and productivity are inversely related. Such an assumption is 
not necessary if individuals receive a “grade” in addition to the level of the signal, and the more able are more likely to get a good 
grade (Weiss, 1983). For simplicity, and to follow the original model in Spence (1974a), we ignore grades and maintain the 
assumption the more able have a lower marginal cost of signaling. Page 8 of 24 
 
 Pooling may occur. If pooling does occur, it yields greater wealth than would signaling. 
 
3. A job allocation model 
A. Outline of the game  
  Most details of the model are found in Assumptions One through Four and in Table One 
in Section 2. Further, suppose there are N individuals in the population. Individuals and 
employers know  of these individuals are more able. If signaling does not occur, all are paid the 
same wage equal to Wpool, with Wpool  = max{(e + 1-), a}. The Riley outcome is when less 
able individuals set y = 0, and more able individuals set y = yRiley---the lowest level of the signal 
that induces a separating equilibrium. Individuals move first. If more able individuals do not 
signal, firms respond and hire individuals in the job where expected productivity is the highest, 
with pay of max{(e + 1-), a}. If signaling occurs, more able individuals set y = yRiley. Less 
able individuals set y = 0. In the case of signaling, firms respond by hiring those with y = yRiley in 
skilled jobs at a wage of g, and those with y = 0 in unskilled jobs at a wage of a.  
 Using  the  intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), we assume signaling only occurs at 
the Riley outcome. Further, using the notion of undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993), 
signaling only occurs if it is preferred by the more able individuals to pooling at y = 0.
12 
 
B. Pooling in unskilled jobs 
 If  a  > (e + 1-), expected productivity with no signaling is greater in unskilled jobs 
than in skilled jobs. This occurs when  < *: 
                                                       
12Cai et al. (2007) consider an equilibrium refinement they call the Local Credibility Test in a signaling game. They consider 
amultiple types and imperfect negative correlation between productivity and the marginal cost of signaling. As with undefeated 
equilibrium, the Local Credibility Test is more likely to select the Riley outcome the lower the percentage of more able 
individuals in the population.  Page 9 of 24 
 
  * = 
   
   .                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
 With  a < e and both a and e > 1, clearly 0 < * < 1. Now we show signaling will always 
occur in this case. Ignore pooling for now. In a signaling equilibrium, those who signal will go to 
skilled jobs and be paid e, and those who do not signal will go to unskilled jobs and be paid a. 
For signaling to occur, more able individuals must prefer to be viewed correctly, and not as less 
able, and the less able must not want to mimic the more able. We must have: 
   
  e - y/g > a,                                                                                                                  (2) 
  e - y < a.                                                                                                                     (3) 
 
  Ineqs.(2) and (3) yield: 
 
 ( e-a)  < y < (e-a)g.                                                                                                      (4) 
 
 With    y = yRiley, the lowest level of the signal that induces a separating/signaling 
equilibrium: 
 
  yRiley  (e-a).                                                                                                                 (5) 
 
  The payoff  to more able individuals from signaling is  Page 10 of 24 
 
(e-a) - yRiley/g = (e-a) - 
     
   = (e-a) 1  
 
   > 0. However, this is also the condition for 
signaling to increase wealth. Because of the assumption all are worth a in unskilled jobs, the 
pooling wage in unskilled jobs is the same as the wage one gets in a signaling equilibrium if one 
does not signal. Signaling occurs and increases wealth because the signal results in the 
reallocation of more able individuals from unskilled jobs to skilled jobs were they are more 
productive, and the output gain exceeds the cost. The private return to signaling, (e-a), also 
equals the social return. 
  As discussed in Section 2, Spence considered the possibility individuals did not have the 
same productivity in unskilled jobs. We briefly consider that case now.
13 With the productivity 
of less able individuals  in unskilled jobs equal to a, there are two possibilities.  
  First, suppose more able individuals have productivity of b in unskilled jobs, with b > a. 
Let the expected MRP in unskilled jobs equal                     . Now b  >                      . The 
social benefit to signaling when pooling is in unskilled jobs is the output gain from more able 
individuals moving from unskilled jobs to skilled jobs, e  - b. However,  
e  - b  < e  -                      = the  private benefit from signaling, so too many will signal: for 
some values of , signaling occurs when it reduces wealth.   
  Second, if productivity of more able individuals in unskilled jobs is d, d < a,  then  
d  <                      . The social benefit to signaling is e  - d  > e  -                      =  the 
private benefit, so too few will signal: for some values of , signaling will not occur when it 
would increase wealth. 
                                                       
13 Another variation, used in Spence (1981), is when the more able have the same productivity in unskilled jobs as the less able 
have in skilled jobs. Spence did not justify this assumption, but it is simply another way of introducing a social return to 
allocating individuals to jobs. It seems more plausible different types of individuals would have the same productivity in the 
unskilled job (as assumed herein) due to a particular skill that is required for skilled jobs (of which the more able have more than 
the less able), with said skill of no value in unskilled jobs. Page 11 of 24 
 
  Since we will find cases of both  inefficient and efficient signaling when all have the 
same productivity in unskilled jobs, we will focus on that case in the rest of the paper---that is, 
we assume all have productivity of a in the unskilled sector. 
 
C. When signaling increases wealth 
 When   > *, pooling would involve all being employed in skilled jobs. In the next sub-
section, we will apply the concept of undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993) to see when 
more able individuals prefer signaling to pooling. Assuming for now signaling occurs, we 
consider when it would increase wealth. Now the social return to signaling comes from moving 
less able individuals from the skilled sector to the unskilled sector, with an output gain of (a-1) 
per less able individual. Thus the total gain to society from signaling is (a-1)(1-)N. The social 
cost of signaling is the amount spent by the more able individuals, which equals 
      
  . When 
pooling is at skilled jobs, signaling increases wealth if  < **: 
 
  ** = 
      
           .                                                                                                       (6)  
 
 Clearly  ** < 1. Also, for ** > *, we must have e > a, which is true. We will see 
below signaling will occur if   < **. Thus, if * <  < **, signaling occurs and increases 
wealth.  
  The private gain to more able individuals from signaling is the increased pay that results,  
[e - (e + 1-)]N. As shown above, the social gain from signaling is (a-1)(1-)N, resulting 
from reallocating the less able from skilled jobs to unskilled jobs. The effect of a higher  on the Page 12 of 24 
 
private gain from schooling is ambiguous. As  increases, the pooling wage rises, so there is less 
of a return per individual, but there are more of the more able individuals. An increase in  
lowers the social gain from signaling because there are fewer less able individuals to reallocate 
to unskilled jobs. For  > **, wealth decreases if signaling occurs. 
 
D. When pooling is preferred to signaling 
  To determine when pooling will occur when it involves all going to skilled jobs, we use 
undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993) to refine the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 
1987). Undefeated equilibrium and the intuitive criterion imply more able individuals will 
deviate from pooling when they are better off by signaling with y = yRiley. Thus, these individuals 
will prefer signaling to pooling if e - 
     
   > (e + 1-). Signaling will occur if  < ***: 
  
*** = 
          
       .                                                                                                           (7) 
 
 With  a < e,  clearly *** < 1. Also, ** < *** if 0 < (a-e)
2(g-1), which is true. The 
possible results are shown in Figure One. Note the actual width of the ranges shown in Figure 




  We can use Figure One to summarize the results so far. For low enough values of ,  
 < *, signaling occurs and increases wealth because the alternative is pooling in unskilled 
jobs. The output gain from signaling involves reallocating more able individuals from unskilled 
jobs to skilled jobs. With the assumption all have the same productivity in unskilled jobs, the 
private return to signaling---the wage increase for the more able---equals the social return. 
  For somewhat higher values of , * < , pooling would be in skilled jobs. There is a 
social gain from signaling---the reallocation of the less able from skilled jobs to unskilled jobs---
but this differs from the private gain---increased earnings for the more able.  
 For  * <  < **, the social gain from signaling exceeds the (social) cost, but for higher 
values of , ** <  < ***, when there are relatively few unskilled individuals, the social gain 
from signaling is less than the cost. For even higher values for ,  > ***, the more able will 
not deviate from pooling, and wealth is higher than if signaling occurred.  
  Thus, only if ** <  < *** will we have inefficient signaling. 
Figure One
























4. The likelihood of efficient signaling, inefficient signaling, and pooling 
A. Basics 
  We found three basic possibilities which depend on . There is a range for  when 
signaling efficiently occurs. Call this range re, with re  = **. There is a range in which signaling 
occurs and is inefficient. This range is ri, with ri  = *** - **. Finally, there is a range when 
pooling occurs and wealth is higher than if signaling occurred. This range is rp, with  
rp = 1 - ***. 
 
B. A change in the marginal cost of signaling for the more able, g 
 Using  eqs. (1), (6), and (7), we have: 
 
 
   
   =  {+}(e-a)(a-1) > 0,                                                                                                  (8) 
 
   
   = {+}[g(a-1)(2-g) + e – a],                                                                                         (9) 
 
   
   = -{+}(e-1)(e-a) < 0.                                                                                                (10) 
 
 Now   
   
    > 0 if g < 2. If g increases, the marginal cost of signaling for more able 
individuals decreases. Since 
    
    > 0, the pooling range, rp, falls as g increases and more able 
individuals find signaling preferable to pooling for larger values of . Also, the range of efficient 
signaling increases as signaling is less costly---
   
    > 0. Thus, the residual, the range of 
inefficient signaling, could increase or decrease as g increases. For low enough values of g  Page 15 of 24 
 
(g < 2), a lower marginal cost of signaling increases the range of  for which inefficient 
signaling occurs. 
 
C. A change in the productivity of the more able in skilled jobs, e 
 Again  using  eqs. (1), (6), and (7): 
 
             
   
   = -{+}g(a-1) < 0,                                                                                                      (11) 
             
   
   = {+}(e-a)(a-1)[g(e + a – 2) + e – a] > 0,                                                                 (12) 
  
   
   = {+}g(a-1) > 0.                                                                                                       (13) 
 
  An increase in productivity of the more able in skilled jobs, e, reduces the range for 
efficient signaling for two reasons. First, efficient signaling occurs when pooling would be in 
unskilled jobs. A larger e increases the pooling wage in skilled jobs, so we are less likely to have 
pooling in unskilled jobs---* falls. Second, when pooling is in skilled jobs, the productivity of 
the more able has no impact on the social gain since, with pooling or signaling, the more able 
would be in skilled jobs. However, an increase in e increases yRiley, so signaling cost increases. 
Thus, the maximum value of  for which signaling is efficient, **, falls, another reason re 
decreases. Since the pooling wage in skilled jobs rises as e increases, the pooling range also 
increases. With re decreasing and rp increasing, in principle, the range for inefficient signaling 
could rise or fall, but in fact 
   
   > 0. 
 
D. A change in the productivity of the less able in unskilled jobs, a Page 16 of 24 
 
 Using  eqs. (1), (6), and (7): 
 
          
   
   = {+}g(e-a) > 0,                                                                                                        (14) 
          
   
   = -{+}(e-a)[2(e-1)g(a-1) + 3(e-1)(e-a) + g(e-a)(a-1) + (e-a)
2] < 0,                         (15) 
          
   
   = -{+} < 0.                                                                                                                (16) 
 
  If the less able are more productive in unskilled jobs (da > 0), the range of efficient 
signaling increases. The social gain from signaling is higher when the alternative is pooling in 
skilled jobs since it involves reallocating less able individuals from skilled to unskilled jobs 
where they are now more productive. Since an increase in a lowers yRiley, more able individuals 
prefer signaling to pooling for a greater range of . Thus, d*** > 0, and drp < 0. An increase in 
re and a decrease in rp could imply an uncertain effect on ri, but we have  
   
   < 0. 
  Summarizing the results, we find inefficient signaling is more likely the lower the 
marginal cost of signaling for the more able, the higher the productivity in skilled jobs for the 
more able, and the lower the productivity of the less able in unskilled jobs. As discussed 
previously, when pooling would result in all placed in the unskilled job, Spence found  signaling 
increases wealth if e and g are high enough, a is low enough, and the signal level is low enough.  
We find wealth always is increased with signaling in this case.  
  When pooling would result in all placed in skilled jobs, we get essentially the opposite 
results Spence found in his model when pooling would result in all placed in unskilled jobs: 
signaling is less likely to be efficient when e and g are high and a is low. Also, with pooling in 
skilled jobs, Spence found, when signaling benefits the less able, it also benefits the more able, Page 17 of 24 
 
so wealth clearly increases. We find signaling can not benefit the less able, since they will be 
paid less than the pooling wage if the more able signal; signaling may benefit the more able, and, 
when it does, it may or may not increase wealth, depending on ; and pooling may occur. If 
pooling does occur, it yields greater wealth than would signaling. 
 Thus,  using  the  Riley outcome, the intuitive criterion, and undefeated equilibrium allows 
different and more precise results. 
 
E. Numerical examples 
  We have seen the effect of the variables e, g, and a on the likelihood of equilibria with 
efficient signaling, inefficient signaling, and pooling. To get an idea of the magnitude of the 
ranges for these possibilities, consider Table Two. 
Table Two. Values for *, **, and ***. 
        e         a         g       *        **       ***                Comment 
        2      1.01         2      .01       .02      .51                  Approximately the basic      
                           Spence model with 1 job. 
        2      1.1         2      .1       .18      .55 
        2        1.1         1.5      .1       .14      .4 
        2      1.25          2      .25       .4      .625 
        2      1.25        1.5      .25      .33      .5 
        2      1.5        1.5      .5      .6      .67 
        2      1.5        1.25      .5      .56      .6 
        2      1.1        1.1      .1      .11      .18 
        1.5      1.01        1.5      .02      .03      .35                  Approximately the basic  
                           Spence model with 1 job.     
        1.5      1.1        1.5      .2                    .27      .47 
        1.5        1.25        1.5              .5      .6      .67   
  
  The first and ninth rows in Table Two show results when a = 1.01, which means a less 
able individual is essentially as productive in either type of job. Also, in a signaling equilibrium, 
an individual’s alternative to signaling---going to an unskilled job for a wage of a ---is almost 
the same as what it would be if the individual were placed in the skilled job and viewed as less 
able,  . This is essentially the basic Spence model (1974a) when there is one type of job. Since a Page 18 of 24 
 
is so close to one, for even a very small value for , max{(e + 1-), a} = (e + 1-)---
pooling is in the skilled job. Thus, the unskilled job is almost irrelevant, as evidenced by the 
values of * for these two examples, .01 and .02. 
  The example in the first row is virtually identical to the one-job example prominently 
featured in Spence (1974a): the more able are twice as productive as the less able and have a 
marginal cost of signaling that is ½ that of the less able. However, even with almost no 
possibility for efficient signaling (re = .02), the pooling range is the same size as the range for 
inefficient signaling (rp = ri = .49). This, result is due to the undefeated equilibrium refinement 
choosing pooling when the more able would be worse off deviating to a signaling equilibrium 
with y = yRiley.  
 With  a = 1.01, if the productivity advantage in skilled jobs and marginal cost advantage 
to the more able is lowered somewhat, there still is little possibility of efficient signaling. With  
e = g = 1.5, re is only .03. However, as shown above if, e or g is reduced (assuming g < 2), ri 
falls. We now have ri = .32 and rp = .65. Thus, pooling is twice as likely to occur than inefficient 
signaling, so, even with essentially a world of one job type, inefficient signaling is not 
necessarily the most likely outcome. Only when e and g are high and a is low (close to one) 
would we find ri comparable to the sum of re and rp.  
  With any non-trivial gain from job assignment, the results change significantly. For 
example, compare rows one and four in Table Two. The only difference between the two cases 
in, from row one to row four, a increases from 1.01 to 1.25. In row four, there is a 25% 
productivity gain from less able individuals moving from skilled jobs to unskilled jobs. Note this 
is only ¼ the assumed productivity difference between the more and less able in skilled jobs. Page 19 of 24 
 
Now, re = .4, rp = .375, and ri = .225. The range for efficient signaling is more than 50% larger 
than that for inefficient signaling, and the combined range for efficient signaling and (efficient) 
pooling is more than three times the range for inefficient signaling. 
  Finally, somewhat lower values for e and g, along with a non-trivial value for a, have a 
significant effect on the range of inefficient signaling. For example, suppose  e = g = 1.5, and  
a = 1.25, so the productivity advantage of the less able in unskilled jobs versus skilled jobs is ½ 
the productivity difference between the more and less able in skilled jobs (last row in Table 
Four). Now re = .6, ri = .07, and rp = .33. The efficient signaling range is more than eight times 
the size of the inefficient signaling range, and the combined range for efficient signaling and 
pooling is thirteen times the range for inefficient signaling. Thus, it is plausible the likelihood of 
inefficient signaling is not considerable. 
 
5. Summary 
  A potentially important social return to educational is in the ability to identify 
individuals’ productivity in order to optimally assign them to jobs. Using results for equilibrium 
refinements in signaling games developed since Spence (1974a) considered a model of job 
allocation, it is possible to be more precise than Spence was in determining when signaling 
would occur and what the effect of signaling on wealth would be. We find inefficient signaling is 
more likely the lower the marginal cost of signaling for the more able, the higher the productivity 
in skilled jobs for the more able, and the lower the productivity of the less able in unskilled jobs.  
  In contrast to Spence’s earlier results, we find a clear effect of the fraction of more able 
individuals in the population on the equilibrium. Small values for this fraction are likely to be Page 20 of 24 
 
associated with efficient signaling; somewhat larger values of the fraction would imply 
inefficient signaling, and the highest values of the fraction would result in (efficient) pooling 
equilibrium. The larger the  possible gain from job allocation, the less likely inefficient signaling 
occurs.  
  One implication of these results is higher education might serve a valuable signaling 
function even if little human capital were acquired in universities. Except for the original work 
by Spence (1974a, 1974b), there has been little focus on the social gain from education when the 
educational signal can improve the allocation of individuals to jobs. For example, in his 
comparison of human capital and signaling explanations of wages, Weiss (1995) suggests 
signaling models of education are resisted by some economists because these models imply 
inefficient equilibria since private returns to education exceed social returns. The results herein 
suggest claims of little human capital accumulation in higher education, while not to be ignored, 
should be considered given other potential social benefits of higher education---including its role 






The Intuitive Criterion and Undefeated Equilibria. 
 
For the simplest explanation of the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), consider the case with only one job. 
More able individuals have productivity equal to 2 and a cost of signaling of y/2. Less able individuals have 
productivity equal to 1 and signaling cost of y. The fraction of more able individuals in the population is . Thus the 
pooling wage is Wpool = 2 + 1- = 1 + . Start with the case when   = .75. From Figure A1, if one assumes (as 
with the intuitive criterion) the less able believe pooling remains available to them even if the more able signal to 
separate themselves, then the shaded area contains separating equilibria preferred by the more able to pooling but 
not preferred by the less able. However, if the less able realize signaling by the more able implies a wage = 1 for 
those who do not signal, then the relevant level of utility for the less able is given by           
        . Thus, the less able 
would prefer to signal and be paid 2 as long as y < 1= yRiley, point I3. Since point I3 is below           
     , more able 
individuals will not deviate from the pooling equilibrium with y = 0 and a wage of 1.75. Pooling survives the 
undefeated equilibrium refinement if  yRiley is not  contained in the area in which the more able will deviate from 
pooling when the less able would not deviate when they believe pooling remains available to them. In Figure A2, 
with  = .5, yRiley  (point J2) is contained in the shaded area. In essence, a pooling equilibrium does not survive if the 
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